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The Revolutionary Guards have stopped denying it

For seven months the Revolutionary Guard Corps said little about the small explosions heard from Iran's southern coast at night. On Wednesday it said something. A spokesman told state television that the corps was striking targets in the Strait of Hormuz every twenty-four hours, and that America had stopped responding. It is the first time the force has appeared to claim the campaign its own officials and insurers have spent months attributing to it, and it changes what the next month of shipping risk looks like.

By Muhammad MehdiPublished 3 October 2026 at 11:00 UTC· Updated 3 October 2026 at 11:00 UTC· 3 min read

For seven months the loudest unexplained sound in the Persian Gulf was a small explosion heard at night off Iran's southern coast. Tankers reported them, insurers priced them, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed individual incidents when it suited and denied the pattern when it did not. The pattern itself was never officially acknowledged.

On Wednesday a corps spokesman told state television that the force was striking targets in the Strait of Hormuz every twenty-four hours. He put it plainly: we prevent them from passing, but for some time now, America has not responded.

That is a low bar and it is still a first. The claim is not that Iran has attacked anyone new. It is that the daily attacks heard from the Iranian coast are now, on the record, the daily attacks heard from the Iranian coast.

What the numbers show

The scale is not visible in the public record because it is mostly unsuccessful. According to data shared with the New York Times by a Western security official who spoke on condition of anonymity, Iran has been launching about 30 drone attacks and 10 anti-ship missile attacks a week against commercial ships transiting the strait since the beginning of August. The same official said at least four commercial ships had been hit in the previous ten days.

Those figures come from one unnamed official and have not been published independently, so they should be read as an estimate with a named source rather than as a count.

The independent record is thinner and better documented. A monitoring group run by the British Navy reported that since 10 September at least 13 ships, most of them oil tankers, had been struck by projectiles or debris from projectiles. Those reports are voluntary submissions by crews and may be incomplete, and they do not attribute responsibility. Maritime experts quoted alongside the figures said the details suggested many were Iranian.

Put the two together and the picture is consistent: roughly forty attacks a week, most of which miss, against a small number of hulls that do not. The 13 ships struck over roughly three weeks is a hit rate that would be catastrophic for an air force and is survivable for a maritime campaign aimed at pricing rather than at sinking.

What an acknowledged campaign changes

The volume of crude moving through the Gulf has recovered. Oil exports from the Middle East have rebounded in recent weeks and the strait is carrying traffic again, so the campaign is not currently stopping much oil.

What acknowledgement changes is the insurance market, which prices uncertainty rather than throughput. A risk that is officially denied can be modelled as a series of unrelated accidents. A risk that is claimed daily, with a stated purpose, must be priced as a policy.

Gregory Brew, an Iran analyst at the Eurasia Group, described the position on Thursday as a standoff. Negotiations aren't going anywhere, he said, neither side is really budging. On the violence, his reading was that it speaks to the position that both sides are in: neither is looking to aggressively escalate the conflict. But both want to control the waterway.

That is the difficult part of the statement. Iran's stated grievance is the silence from Washington, and the corps spokesman's complaint is precisely that America has not responded. A campaign conducted at this rate, against a target that has not answered, invites exactly the response that would escalate it.

For the crews, none of this is abstract. The instructions that decide whether a master proceeds, waits for daylight, or turns back are issued by insurers, and insurers cannot price a disputed risk. They can price an admitted one.

Frequently asked questions

What did the Revolutionary Guard Corps actually say?

A spokesman told state television that the corps was striking targets in the Strait of Hormuz every twenty-four hours, and said: We prevent them from passing, but for some time now, America has not responded. The remarks appear to be the first time the force has acknowledged the daily attacks heard from Iran's southern coast, rather than claiming individual incidents selectively.

How many attacks are there actually?

According to data shared with the New York Times by a Western security official, Iran has been launching about 30 drone attacks and 10 anti-ship missile attacks per week against commercial ships in the strait since the beginning of August. The official said at least four commercial ships had been hit in the previous ten days. The figure comes from an unnamed official and has not been published independently.

What is the independent record?

A monitoring group run by the British Navy reported that since 10 September at least 13 ships, most of them oil tankers, had been struck by projectiles or debris from projectiles. Those reports are voluntary submissions by crews and may be incomplete, and they do not attribute responsibility. Maritime experts quoted alongside the figures said the details suggested many were Iranian.

Does this mean shipping through the strait has stopped?

No. Oil exports from the Middle East have rebounded in recent weeks, and the strait is carrying traffic. What has changed is that the campaign against shipping is now acknowledged rather than disputed, which affects insurance pricing and crew risk assessment rather than the volume of crude moving today.

Sources

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